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A number of studies have attempted to compare modes of regulation of the accounting profession in different 
countries.  Because  their  wide scope, most of these  studies don’t achieve  the level of insight given by local 
researches. Therefore, it appears necessary to focus on one of these topics. This paper presents a comparison of 
the disciplinary process of the accounting profession of two countries considered as extremely different: the 
United States and France. Baker et al. (2005) studied the differences in regulation of the accounting profession 
(especially  the  one  of  statutory  audit)  in  these  two  countries.  They  found  that  the  preponderant  modes  of 
regulation were a mix of “associationism” and “legalism” in the United States, while a mix of legalism and 
corporatism in France. If this interpretation seems mostly accurate, the paper suggests that this classification is 
not exactly true when considering the disciplinary process of the accounting profession in the United States and 
in France. As a matter of fact, it appears that beyond differences, those countries are fairly close in matter of the 
power of the State within the disciplinary process, as well as in the nature and the number of disciplinary 
sanctions taken against public accountants and auditors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
After financial scandals such as ENRON, WORLCOM, PARMALAT, or ELF AQUITAINE, 
the  confidence  of  the  public  in  companies’  reporting  has  been  shaken.  The  accounting 
profession plays a major role in both the establishment of the financial statements and if 
necessary  their  revision  afterwards.  The  confidence  of  stakeholders  is  therefore  greatly 
dependent on the credibility of the accounting profession. This credibility is based on both the 
moral  character  and  the  technical  competence  of  the  professionals.  Professional  ethics 
depends upon the belief of a Code of Conduct and on the enforcement of the code through 
sanctions imposed upon those who disrespect the code. Technical competence is achieved 
through formal education such as what is learned in college, as well as continuing education, 
and informally by maintaining an awareness of the changes in professional standards. 
 
Governments and professional accountants have been working on the restoration of the public 
confidence in the market place, and in both Public Accounting and Statutory Audit. This has 
led to the issuance of new laws (Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States, Financial Security 
Law  in  France,  Companies  Bill  in  the  United  Kingdom,  Kon  Trag  and 
Bilanzrechtsreformgesetz  in  Germany).  The  swiftness  and  effectiveness  of  government 
intervention raises a question regarding the modes of regulation of the accounting profession.  
 
A number of researcher’s have studied various aspects of the regulation of the accounting 
profession in different countries. Local studies provide an insight that cannot be achieved by 
comparative  studies.    A  comparative  study  tends  to  have  too  general  a  focus.  However, 
comparative  studies  are  very  useful  in  that  they  help  the  reader  in  gaining  a  broad 
understanding of concepts present in a number of countries To overcome the difficulties with 
both a forms of study it appears necessary to compare countries on a narrow field. This paper 
therefore focuses on the disciplinary process of the accounting profession. As we highlighted 
earlier that it is a major aspect in the search for public confidence in public accountancy. This 
study will examine the discipline of accounting professionals by examining France and the 
United States.  
 
We begin with a review of the studies regarding discipline of the accounting profession and 
then proceed to a brief overview of the history of the profession. We will then present the 
characteristics of the disciplinary processes of both France and the United States. This will 
include an examination of: 
•  Who can initiate a case;  
•  When appeals to a case are possible;  
•  How the courts function;  
•  What punishments professionals are subject to;  
•  How cases are  publicized; and finally; 
•  What are the number of disciplinary  cases initiated and the number of  sanctions 
imposed.  
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1. THE DISCIPLINE IN THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION 
Local research studies such as the ones of Loeb (1972), St. Pierre and Anderson (1984), 
Parker  (1994),  Thomas  and  Seaman  (1996),  Robertson  and  Hawkins  (1999),  Moriarity 
(2000), and Bédard (2001) focused on precise aspects of the regulation of the accounting and 
audit  profession  in  one  single  country.  While  Robertson  and  Hawkins  (1999)  prescribed 
changes  to  Certified  Public  Accountants’  self-regulation,  St.  Pierre  and  Anderson  (1984) 
analysed the factors associated with lawsuits against Public Accountants.   They looked at the 
legal aspect of regulation through the study of court decisions during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Moriarity studied the level of sanctions imposed to Certified Public Accountants (CPA’s). He 
focused on the disciplinary sanctions applied by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) to its members. Parker again used the national level of study (1994) in 
order to determine whether the disciplinary procedures of the Australian profession reflected 
the role of ethics codes in the search for the private interest of the accounting profession.  
 
To study the enforcement of ethics in the accounting profession in the United States and 
Canada many authors have examined how individual states has imposed sanctions for ethical 
violations.   Loeb used the disciplinary files of the State Society and State Board of a large 
Midwestern State. Thomas and Seaman (1996) also based their study on the violations of the 
Code of Professional Conduct of a State Board for Public Accountancy (State of Texas). 
Finally, Bédard (2001) informed the reader on the discipline of the accounting profession in 
Québec, using the data of the Québec Chartered Accountants’ professional association.  
 
Beside  Robertson  and  Hawkins  (1999),  all  the  authors  listed  above  focused  on  the 
disciplinary aspect of the accounting profession in one single country. The data furnished are 
therefore  very  informative  and  quite  exhaustive,  which  provides  the reader  with  precious 
information  unavailable  in  international  studies  having  a  wide  scope.  Blij  et  al.  (1998) 
compared the disciplinary practices of auditors in both Germany and the Netherlands.  
 
This paper attempts to overcome the problem of lack of information associated with most 
international  studies,  while  at  the  same  time  providing  the  useful insights  given  by  local 
researchers.  We decided to focus on one aspect of the accounting regulation, the disciplinary 
process, and then compare it between two given countries (the United States and France).    
 
We have seen that a number of authors have studied the disciplinary aspect of the accounting 
profession. When observing the data used by the authors (Figure 1), we see that they focus on 
different levels of the regulation. That is on the sanctions given by different organisms: State 
courts (civil and criminal), professional societies (ex: AICPA, State Societies, disciplinary 
sanctions at the  society level), and State Boards (disciplinary sanctions at the state level, 
through State organizations). Different data is used to study the same subject.  
 
We are left to wonder what are the different organisms involved in the disciplinary process, 
and which level of study is the most adequate to get an understanding of the disciplinary 
practices of the accounting profession. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to 
describe the actors of the disciplinary process. Then to explain, using tangible factors such as   4 
which organism holds the ultimate sanction to  professionals that is the right to withdraw 
licensure to practice, why one level is more interesting than the other. 
 
Figure 1. The Discipline in the Accounting Profession 
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In 2002 in the French accounting review Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, Bédard, Baker and Prat 
Dit Hauret (see also Baker, 2005) studied the regulation of statutory audit in Canada, the 
United  States,  and  France.    They  used  the  analytical  framework  developed  by  Puxty, 
Willmott, Cooper and Lowe in 1987. This framework used to study accounting in multiple 
countries is based on the exploration of social order models by Streeck and Schmitters (1985). 
These  authors  identified  three  principles  of  social  orders:  Market,  State  and  Community 
(Puxty et al., 1987, p. 276). As interpreted by Puxty et al., these principles can be articulated 
in  the  context  of  accounting  regulation,  which  is  really  at  the  intersection  of  ordering 
principles (Puxty et al., 1987, p. 277).  
 
Bédard, Baker and Prat Dit Hauret (2002), leaving aside the principle of Community, make 
use of four ideal-types of regulation according to the respecting weight of Market and State to 
define  the  regulation  of  the  statutory  audit  profession  in  the  three  countries  studied: 
“Liberalism”, “Associationism”, “Corporatism” and “Legalism”. 
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Figure 2. Ideal-types of regulation 
 
Market                        State 
  Liberalism    Associationism  Corporatism    Legalism 
 
Issued from Bédard et al. (2002), p. 141 
 
After a brief review of these ideal-types of regulation
1, the authors describe for each of the 
three countries: the organisms implicated in statutory audit regulation, along with how audit is 
regulated, which relates to licensure requirements, norms development, practice regulation, 
and professional liability. 
 
The authors show the importance of state and private organizations in both France and the 
United States. They further suggest that professional associations such as State Societies and 
the AICPA have disciplinary powers over CPAs in the United States. To prove this statement 
the  authors  note  the  disciplinary  sanctions  given  to  members  that  are  published  on  the 
professional societies’ websites. The authors define the disciplinary liability of the American 
Accounting profession as “associationist”.   The French profession is considered to be a mix 
of  “corporatism”  and  “legalism”.  This  classification  suggests  that  the  role  of  public 
organizations is major in France and nonexistent in the United States. 
 
Indeed, the authors do not insist on the fact that public organizations at the State level, (State 
Boards for Public Accountancy) do also have the power to sanction their members. At this 
point, it is essential to note that membership to this State organization is made mandatory by 
the fact that the professional is a CPA. As noticed by an investigator of the New York State 
Education Department’s Office of the Professions (NYSOP)
2, the NYSOP, which acts as the 
State Board for Public Accountancy, “has the right to license and the right to withdraw this 
license”. Then, membership is voluntary for professional organizations, whereas in order to 
practice, registration with State organizations is mandatory. Therefore, the population under 
the  supervision  of  State  agencies  is  consists  of  the  entire  number  of  CPAs  licensed  and 
registered in that State.  
 
In  addition,  if  a  professional  gets  expelled  from  the  voluntary  organization,  from  the 
professional society (AICPA, or State society) he belonged to, he is still able to practice as a 
CPA in the State he is licensed, until he eventually gets his license terminated by the State 
organization. In the United States, the State level is therefore the ultimate level where a CPA 
                                                             
1 The four ideal-types of regulation are defined by the authors (in Baker et al., 2005, p. 4-5) as follows: 
Liberalism: “The regulation of statutory auditors is based on the market for audit services”. 
Associationism: “Regulatory activities are effectuated through professional associations that represent and 
defend the interests of their members”.  
Corporatism: “The state not only permits the creation of professional associations, it integrates the associations 
into its regulatory apparatus”. 
Legalism: “Regulatory power resides in the hands of the state, and it operates pursuant to rules and regulations 
promulgated by the state”.   
2 Interview that took place in August 2004 
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can  be  excluded  from  the  accounting  profession.  The  role  of  governmental  agencies  is 
therefore, as in France, a major one in the regulation of the Accounting Profession.  
 
Those two facts, entire population representation and power to withdraw license of practice, 
allows us to use the data issued from the disciplinary measures given by the NYSOP to New 
York CPAs.  Choosing the New York State Board for Public Accountancy as surrogate for 
the study of the disciplinary process in the United States is based on a couple of issues.  First, 
the history of the accounting profession in the United States, finds its roots in the State of 
New York.  Also, Moriarity (2000) found that during his study, New York State had the 
largest number of disciplinary items (103). This makes the State of New York one of the most 
active States in term of sanctioning accounting professionals. Therefore, it is very logical to 
consider the State of New York as a surrogate for the United State in studying the disciplinary 
process. 
 
For France, the choice of the data to study is quite obvious. The public and the private aspects 
of  the  professional  regulation  are  integrated  within  the  same  organizations:  the  Conseil 
Supérieur de l’Ordre des Experts-Comptables for Public Accountants and the Compagnie 
Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes for Auditors.   
2. COMPARISON OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ACCOUNTING 
PROFESSION’S DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES IN FRANCE AND IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
The question of what makes a profession has been studied by sociologists including Hall 
(1968) and Abbott (1988).  Based upon an analysis of the professionalization literature, Hall 
provides the following attributes, which are usually associated with a profession: 
•  Creation of a full time occupation. 
•  The establishment of training that reflects a knowledge base. 
•  Formation of professional associations. 
•  Formation of a code of ethics. 
 
In the US, the term CPA comprises both accountants working in public accounting firms and 
employees  in  non  accounting  firms.  In  France,  those  employees  are  not  included  in  the 
accounting  profession.  In  this  sense,  the  French  Profession  is  more  a  profession  in  the 
meaning of Hall.  In this study the use of the CPA profession is based upon those individuals 
in public practice, and does not include those working for non-accounting firms. 
2.1. The roots of the accounting profession and its disciplinary laws 
France 
French accounting organizations can be traced throughout history, like in the Communauté 
des maîtres écrivains et arithméticiens jurés experts de la ville de Paris, established in 1704 
and mentioned by Cocault et Pinceloup (quoted by Ramirez, 2001, p. 393). The first major 
accountants’ organization was created in 1881 and was entitled Société de Comptabilité de 
France.  Then  the  Compagnie  des  Experts-Comptables  de  Paris  was  established  in  1912,   7 
which promoted for professionals to be both competent and independent (Ramirez, 2001, p. 
398).  
 
It  was  not  before  1927  and  then  in  1937  that  diplomas  (brevet  d’Expert-Comptable  and 
Brevet  professionel  comptable)  were  created  (Burlaud,  1998,  p.  659).  The  French 
Government  waited  until  1942  and  then  1945  to  regulate  the  accounting  profession  and 
establish the qualification of Expert-Comptable and rules governing all the aspects of the 
profession (Ordonnance issued on September 19
th, 1945).  
 
The 1945 ruling reveals an important implication of the Government in the regulation of 
accounting profession. It is important to note that at this time the development of a code of 
ethics is mandated to the profession by the French Government. In France the Code of Ethics 
includes  technical  competence.    The  motto  of  the  profession  is  in  terms  of  Science, 
Consciousness and Independence (CSOEC, 2004, p.36), which clearly recalls the guidelines 
based on competence and independence given by the Compagnie des Experts-Comptables de 
Paris in 1912.    
Like American CPAs, French Public Accountants and Auditors are mostly the same people. 
As a matter of fact, any Public Accountant can register as an Auditor. It is interesting to note 
that the idea of a corporation of Auditors was raised by a law issued in 1966 (Loi n°66-537 du 
24 juillet 1966), only forty years ago. That led to the creation of the Compagnie Nationale des 
Commissaires aux Comptes in 1969 (Décret n°69-810 du 12 août 1969). 
 
The question of accounts’ revision can be traced back to the legislation of 1863. This law was 
the first one making private companies mandate one or more Auditors (Castell et Pasqualini, 
1995, p. 6). The role of auditing has been successively regulated, especially with the law of 
July 24




Accounting  professionals,  who  where  known  as  “expert-accountants”  in  the  19
th  century, 
became organized as a profession during  the same time period as the French profession. In 
the British Isles, the development of accounting organizations spread from 1853 to 1919. 
Major factors explaining the development of accounting organizations in western countries 
include industrialization, trade and financial panics. According to Parker (1994 b), the need 
for accounting professionals in Britain followed the “growth of large-scale organizations and 
in particular of the railways, the development of the limited liability company, the high rate of 
insolvency, auditing, costing and tax services” (p. 595). The organization of a profession in 
the United States would then be natural considering the intense trade between Britain and the 
United States during the end of the 19
th century. In addition, most accountants in the United 
States  came  from  England  or  Scotland  (Markham,  2002,  Vol  1.,  p.  333).  Markham  also 
suggests that financial panics (panics of 1857, 1877 and 1884 in the United States; Panama 
Mania  in  France)  gave  the  opportunity  to  accounting  professionals  to  get  organized  and 
recognized as a profession (p.332).  
 
The American Accounting profession became organized through two organizations: the New 
York Institute of Accountants (NYIA) and the American Association of Public Accountants 
(AAPA), which were respectively incorporated in 1882 and in 1886. The latter was created by   8 
New York accountants and in turn was to serve the purpose of enhancing the reputation of the 
accounting profession at the national level (Edwards, 1954, p. 58).  
 
The search for public confidence led these two organizations to seek legal recognition and the 
licensing of Public Accountants from the Regents of the University of the State of New York. 
In 1896, the qualification of Certified Public Accountant was passed as law by the State of 
New  York  (Zeff,  2003,  p.  190).  With  this  early  legislation  regarding  the  accounting 
profession,  we  can  see  that  the  place  of  the  State  in  the  regulation  of  the  accounting 
profession goes much far back in the case of the United States than in France. The French 
Government waited almost half a century after the Law of 1867 before regulating  accounting 
with the decree of 1935. 
 
The quest for legitimating the accounting profession was a main factor in the development of 
codes of ethics. The first code was issued in 1905 as part of the bylaws of the newly formed 
American Association of Public Accountants (from the merger of the NYIA and the AAPA) 
and contained only two rules (Preston et al., 1995, p. 512-515). 
 
Preston et al. (1995) explains how the rules of the code of ethics of the American accounting 
profession evolved to become more numerous and precise. This contrasts with the philosophy 
of early codes, which rules “were deliberately limited to emphasize the moral inherent in the 
accountant’s character” (Preston et al., 1995, p. 528). 
 
Today, CPAs have to follow the ethics codes of the professional organizations to which they 
belong as members.  In addition, CPAs have to follow the rules of the State Board for Public 
Accountancy  of  the  State  in  which  they  are  licensed.  In  the  State  of  New  York,  the 
Constitution of the State and the statutes passed by Legislation give the Board of Regents of 
the University of New York the authority to appoint and examine a board for each of the 
forty-four regulated professions. This is how the Office of the Profession (NYSOP) acts as a 
State  Board  for  Public  Accountancy  for  the  Board  of  Regents  especially  in  terms  of 
disciplinary matters.   
 
Therefore, by being regulated by the Regents of the University of New York, the accounting 
profession has to follow the Education Law and the Rules of the Board of the Regents. One of 
these rules (Part 29, §29.10, Article 12) is for CPAs to follow the standards promulgated by 
the profession (i.e. AICPA) and the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles issued by the 
Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB).  After  meeting  the  education  standards 
required by the NYSOP, a candidate has to sit for an examination, which is designed by the 
AICPA. But in the end, the profession and the State regulators are inextricably linked, an 
individual is licensed by the NYSOP. This implies that this agency has exclusive authority to 
withdraw  a  professional’s  license  after  disciplinary  investigations.  This  penalty  can  be 
imposed if one is found guilty of professional misconduct as defined by the Part 29 of the 
Rules of the Board of Regents, the Article 130 of the Education Law and the part 70 of the 
Regulations  of  the  Commissioner  (the  Commissioner  is  appointed  by  the  Board  of  the 
Regents of the State of New York).   9 
2.2. Characteristics of the disciplinary processes in France and in the United States  
2.2.1. Initiating cases 
France 
The  rulings  relating  to  the  profession  of  Public  Accountant  do  not  provide  detailed 
information about whom is able to issue a complaint and initiate a disciplinary case (Décret 
n°70-147 du 19 février 1970). However, the majority of the cases initiated against Public 
Accountants emerged from reviews
3 conducted by the different regional accounting councils. 
The  frequency  of those  reviews  is  not  mandated  by  the  regional  councils’  internal  rules.  
However, they cannot take place more than once every three years (Lemaignan A., 1989, p. 
40 and 423). If a Public Accountant is suspected of carelessness in his professional practice 
and he did not follow the code of conduct of the profession (Code des devoirs professionnels), 
then  the  accountant  is  subject  to  the  disciplinary  powers  of  the  regional  disciplinary 
chambers.  
 
Official texts are more precise concerning who can initiate a disciplinary case against an 
Auditor. According to the Annual Report of the Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes 
(H3C, 2005, p. 91):  
•  the Presidents of a regional company,  
•  the President of the national company,  
•  the Minister of Justice,  
•  the State Prosecutor, and  
•  the General State Attorney  
can initiate a disciplinary case at the regional level.  Since the new law relating to financial 
security (Article L.821-10 of the Code de Commerce, annexe 2), the President of the newly 
formed AMF (Autorité des Marchés Financiers, the French SEC) can refer to the General 
State Attorney requesting disciplinary measures to be taken. In addition, the Presidents of 
regional companies as well as the President of the national company can order disciplinary 
actions after professional reviews help detect professional malpractices. Disciplinary actions 
can also be mandated by a peer, the audited society, or by any of its stockholders (CNCC, 
1996, p. 9). 
 
United States 
In the State of New York, the approach appears to be less procedural than is the case in 
France.  Anybody, a professional or not, can report a complaint to one of the New York 
regional offices of professional discipline.  A complaint form is accessible on the internet on 
the NYSOP website. Any client, or peer can directly report the misconduct of an accounting 
professional.  
 
Professional misconduct can also be revealed by peer reviews as prescribed by the AICPA. 
Those reviews are conducted under the authority of the AICPA or by the State CPA Society 
of a specific State (NYSSCPA for the State of New York). A professional, who is found 
guilty of malpractice, is then subject to disciplinary measures at the societies’ level, as far as 
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these societies are responsible for disciplining their members. The AICPA and the NYSSCPA 
can refer the cases to the NYSOP. It is however not systematically the case. The measures 
taken by the AICPA are published in the Journal of Accountancy. By studying the decisions 
published, we notice that a significant number of accounting professionals expelled from the 
national professional association can still practice as CPAs in the State of New York. 
2.2.2. Possibilities of appeal 
France 
A  Public  Accountant  who  is  sanctioned  at  the  regional  level  can  appeal  the  case  to  the 
national council’s disciplinary chamber. The same is true for Auditors, who can appeal to the 
newly formed Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes. 
 
United States 
No possibility of appeal is given at the NYSOP level. However, it has raised the question of 
what  happens  to  license  restoration  after  revocation.  After  waiting  for  three  years  at  a 
minimum, an individual can request for license restoration by proving to the Board of Regents 
that “he or she is worthy of the privilege of having a professional license” (NYSOP’s website: 
Disciplinary Actions). 
2.2.3. Composition and functioning of the disciplinary courts 
France 
It is interesting to note that in France, at the national level, when a sanction is appealed, the 
court has more individuals representing the public rather than professionals.  This is different 
than how process exists at the regional level. 
 
The  regional  chamber,  related  to  Public  Accountants’  discipline,  is  composed  of  one 
representative of the Government (the President of the appeal court of the region, who is 
designated by the Minister of justice) and two members of the regional council of Public 
Accountants. As we move to the appeal level (national), the Government has more impact as 
it  is  represented  by  three  out  of  five  members.  The  Minister  of  justice  designates  one 
President from any of the courts of appeals. The Minister of finance and economy mandates 
the  last  two  representatives  of  the  Government.  The  remaining  members  are  Public 
Accountants (Article 49 de l’Ordonnance du 19 septembre 1945, modifiée par la Loi n° 68-
946 du 31 octobre 1968, article 19). 
 
The audit profession has less prominence in the case of the disciplinary process as compared 
to  Public  Accountants.  Auditors  represent  one  out  of  the  six  members  of  the  regional 
disciplinary chambers, instead of two out of three for the Public Accounting profession. For 
the  auditor’s  disciplinary  hearing,  three  of  the  other  members  are  judges,  and  one  is  a 
University Professor. The law is not very precise concerning the last member. It only states 
that it should be an individual qualified in management issues (Article 8, Décret n°69-810 du 
12 août 1969, modifié par le Décret n°85-665 du 4 juillet 1985). 
 
The security law of August 2003 transferred the role of disciplining to the national level with 
the change from the national company of auditors (CNCC) to the High Council for Audit   11 
(H3C).  H3C, as compared to the CNCC, is independent from the profession and comprises 
an important number of public representatives. The disciplinary court of appeal for Auditors 
consists of three judges, the President of the newly formed Autorité des Marchés financiers, 
one representative of the Minister of finance and economy, one University Professor, three 
individuals qualified in matters of management and three Auditors (article L. 821-3 du Code 
de commerce).  
 
United States 
In  New  York,  the  disciplinary  hearing  shall  be  conducted  by  a  panel  of  three  or  more 
members (subtitle 6510 of the Article 130 of the Education Law of the State of New York). 
The panel contains a minimum of : 
-  Two members of the State Board for Accountancy, 
-  One public representative of the State Board for Accountancy. 
 
This panel is appointed by the executive secretary of the State Board, who also designates the 
chairperson.  Finally,  the  Education  Department  can  appoint  an  administrative  officer, 
admitted to practice as an attorney in the State of New York. The administrative officer is 
non-voting, but assures that the procedures are respected, and the report drafts are signed by 
the chairperson. The majority of the State Board members are accounting professionals. We 
can  conclude  that  beside  the  chairperson  and  the  administrative  officer,  professional 
accountants represent 2/3 of the disciplinary panel. 
 
In both countries the disciplinary measures appear to be heard by a panel where the profession 
is quite well represented under the strict supervision of representatives of the State. In France, 
representatives of the Government sit at the disciplinary chambers. In the State of New York, 
every decisions taken by the disciplinary panel is reviewed by the Board of the Regents. 
2.2.4. Punishments 
France 
A Public Accountant found guilty of professional malpractice, brings upon himself a variety 
of sanctions (Ordonnance issued on September 19th, 1945, Title IV, Article 53) which can be 
as follows: 
- a warning,  
- a reprimand, 
- a blame, 
- a suspension for a limited time, 
- an expulsion from the professional organization, associated with the impossibility to 
practice as a Public Accountant. 
 
In addition, Professionals sanctioned can not be elected as members of any of the regional 
councils of the Ordre des Experts Comptables.  According to the Décret n°69-810 issued in 
1969, and modified May 27
th, 2005, an auditor who did not follow the code of conduct of the 
profession (Code de déontologie de la profession de commissaire aux comptes) is subject to 
the same sanctions described above for Public Accountants, besides the reprimand.  
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United States 
The Board of Regents of the State of New York investigates and prosecutes professional 
misconduct through the New York State Education Department’s Office of the Profession. 
Licensees,  who  are  found  guilty  of  professional  misconduct,  are  subject  to  a  range  of 
penalties that includes:  
-  censure,  
-  reprimand,  
-  fines (up to $10,000 for each violation),  
-  suspensions and/or probationary terms.  
-  In case of more severe misconduct, the professional can have his/her license revoked. 
 
In the following section we will see that the impact of the punishments on professionals is 
dependent on the publicity made of the sanctions. 
 
2.2.5. Publication of cases 
France 
As far as the public accounting profession is concerned, no publicity is made around the 
sanctions given to professionals. In addition, decisions are disseminated differently if they 
have been treated at the national or at the regional level.  
 
If an appeal is made to a case, the national discipline chamber is in charge. Case law is 
maintained, up to 1990, at the accounting’ documentation center
4. This information is also 
spread through the accounting review Revue Française de Comptabilité for the years 1989 to 
1992  (Revue  Française  de  Comptabilité,  1992,  p.19).  Cases  after  1992  are  no  longer 
published. However, the information about the number of disciplinary cases is found in the 
CSOEC’s annual reports. The ethics committee of the CSOEC also publishes statistics, in the 
professional journal SIC
5, from both the regional chambers and the national chamber.  
 
The information relating to disciplinary measures taken against Auditors is communicated 
widely. Disciplinary cases are published on a single sheet of paper and added to the Bulletin 
National  des  Commissaires  aux  Comptes,  a  professional  publication  received  by  all  the 
auditors  in  France.  Even  if  this  is  confined  within  the  profession,  the  publication  of  the 
information is contrary to the accounting profession.  The cases reported here are anonymous 
and refer to both regional and national (now the H3C) chambers’ decisions.  
 
Only decisions that lead to the suspension or the revocation of membership of an accounting 
professional or an auditor are published outside the two professions.  This information is 
accessible to anyone in the Bulletin officiel des annonces civiles et commerciales (Article 110 
du Décret du 12 Août 1969, modifié par le Décret n°2005-599 du 27 mai 2005).  
 
                                                             
4 The Bibliotique (Public Accounting Profession’s documentation center) is located in Paris and is accessible to 
anyone 
5 To this day, most reports can be attributed to Alain Lemaignan (Lemaignan A., 1999, 2001) 
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It appears that the impact of the punishments on professionals is dependent on the publicity 
made  of  the  sanctions.  Sanctions  such  as  reprimands  or  warnings  do  not  have  a  major 
influence (if any) on the professionals. On the contrary, a professional who is prevented from 
practicing cannot make a living anymore. The principle of the fine in the United States is 
based on the same idea that financial loses are  dissuasive. In addition, the fact that only 
decisions referring to the prevention from practicing are published, confirms that less severe 
disciplinary measures do not have an impact neither financial, nor on the reputation of Public 
Accountants or Auditors.  
 
United States 
Final decisions taken by the Board of Regents of the State of New York are available on the 
NYSOP’s  website  (for  the  period  1994  to  present).  One  can  access  those  decisions  by 
determining a specific time frame, or the name of a particular professional. The publication of 
the disciplinary cases is not anonymous as it is in France. Anybody is able to know about the 
disciplinary file of any professional in the State of New York, as long as the professional has 
been subject to disciplinary measures. Cases, which resulted in a dismissal, are not published 
on the web.  
 
St. Pierre and Anderson (1984, p.242), suggest that the accounting professional has been “in 
trouble”  if  the  case  was  heard,  “regardless  of  the  outcome”
6.    The  CPA’s  reputation  is 
impaired by the publication of the disciplinary case he was involved in, even if he was not 
found  guilty  of  professional  misconduct.  This  impaired  reputation  could  then  lead  to  a 
decrease in the “firm’s ability to attract new clients or to keep existing clients” (Chaney and 
Philipich, 2002, p.1244). 
 
Contrary to France, any measure, whatever its gravity, is published on the website of the 
NYSOP, with the name of the professional. The cost of minor measures such as warnings or 
reprimands, is therefore, much more important on American professionals than on French 
professionals.  
2.2.6 Number of cases 
France 
The number of cases treated by regional discipline chambers averages 66 cases a year
7. If we 
consider a population of Public Accountants of about 15,000 members (2001 Annual Report 
of the CSOEC), this indicates that less than 0.5% of the population was summoned to appear 
before the regional discipline chambers. Only 0.3%
8 of the professional members of the OEC 
had  disciplinary  sanctions  taken  against  them  at  both  the  regional  and  national  levels 
(Duperret and Lemaignan, 1996, Lemaignan, 1999). 
 
In her study, Garmilis (2003) collected the disciplinary cases treated by the regional and 
national chambers of discipline of the auditing profession in France for the period 1991 to 
2004.  This  study  reveals  that  the  regional  chambers  dealt  with  179  cases,  on  which  82 
professionals appealed to the national chamber of discipline. When taking the year 1998 as an 
                                                             
6 Emphasis in the original text 
7 This estimate is computed on the following information : 398 cases for 6 years (from 1993 to 1998) 
8 This estimate is computed on information based on the professional publication SIC (1996 and 1999)   14 
example, we notice that 17 cases where treated by the regional chambers, which resulted in 
0.07% of sanctioning on a population of auditors composed of 13,237 individuals (Annual 
Report of the CNCC, 1998).  
 
United States 
For  the  period  1994  to  2004,  the  Board  of  Regents  took  an  average  of  23  disciplinary 
measures per year relating to misconduct in the accounting profession of the State of New 
York. On a population of NY registered CPAs and PAs of about 35,000 (as of January 1
st, 
2002, according to the NYSOP’s website), this represents less than 0.07% of the accounting 
professionals  that  were  subject  to  disciplinary  measures.  We  do  not,  however,  have 
accessibility to the number of professionals whose disciplinary cases resulted in a dismissal. 
As the cases are not anonymous, their publication could harm the professionals implicated in 
disciplinary cases, while they were not found guilty of any professional misconduct.  
 
In comparing the results in the two countries, it is important to note that the Board of Regents 
does not deal with fee disputes, as is the case with the OEC and the CNCC disciplinary 
chambers.  For  the  period  1991-2003,  the  regional  chambers  of  discipline  of  the  French 
auditing profession treated 44 cases relating to relations with clients, which mainly refers to 
fee disputes.  This represents almost 18% of the misconduct cases. No sanction is generally 
applied to those cases. Mainly, the disciplinary chambers state the amount to be paid by the 
client.  This  information  greatly  reduces  the  percentage  of  the  professionals  involved  in 
disciplinary cases within the accounting and auditing professions in France.  If we disregard 
the issue of fee disputes when analysing the French data, the number of professional sanctions 
is 0.07%.  This is basically the same rate of sanctions found in New York State. 
 
The  characteristics  of  the  disciplinary  processes  described  above,  (Initiating  cases, 
Possibilities of appeal, Composition and functioning of the disciplinary courts, Punishments),   
are summarized in the following figures:  
France, public accounting– Figure 3, 
France, auditing – Figure 4, and  
New York  - Figure 5.   15 
Figure 3. The disciplinary process of the public accounting profession in France 
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Figure 5. The disciplinary process of the accounting profession in the United States 
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3. DISCUSSION 
The study of the disciplinary process of the accounting profession raises the question of the 
place of the Government in the regulation of the American accounting profession. According 
to Wallace (1998, p. 47), the regulation of the accounting profession in the United States “is 
consistent  with  the  market-based  economy  in  the  United  States  and  a  tendency  not  to 
centralize authority within the government setting”. In the same line, Bédard et al. (2002, p. 
164) found that the preponderant system of discipline of the accounting profession in the 
United States was strictly based on Associationism. This means that the authors (Bédard et al., 
2002,  p.164)  consider  the  disciplinary  aspect  of  the  regulation  to  be  supervised  by 
professional associations only. 
 
As far as the disciplinary aspect of the regulation of the accounting profession is concerned, 
the study of the disciplinary process of the accounting profession finds these statements to be 
counterbalanced. We find that today, as in the past, the State of New York has been clearly 
involved  in  the  regulation  of  the  profession.  Unless  the  State  of  New  York  revokes  a 
professional’s licence the professional is allowed to practice in the State. The influence of the 
individual states weakens the role of the profession in disciplining its members.  This power 
implies that in New York State the professional discipline of Certified Public Accountants can 
be defined in terms of Legalism. 
 
The important role that the State of New York plays in disciplining the members of the 
accounting  profession,  suggests  that  the  United  States’  mode  of  regulation  in  terms  of 
discipline  is  very  close  to  the  French  model.  Historically  the  accounting  profession  in 
America obtained recognition by the State. This granted the professional associations the 
supervision they sought in terms of licensing CPAs. In France, the right to practice as Public 
Accountants or Auditors is also regulated by law.  
 
Representatives  of  the  government  participate  in  the  composition  and  functioning  of  the 
disciplinary procedures.  Government representatives sit in the French chambers.  In New 
York, all the decisions taken by professionals within the State agency (NYSOP) are reviewed 
by a panel of State representatives (Regents). Obviously the legal mode of regulation is the 
preponderant model regarding the discipline of the accounting profession in both countries. 
This becomes more evident with the creation of the Public Companies Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB).  This non-profit corporation was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) “to oversee the auditors of public companies” (PCAOB, 2003, p. 2).  
 
In the United States there were concerns that consulting revenue fees were part of the problem 
with Arthur Andersen’s handling of the Enron audit.  This lead to the SOX mandate that 
public accounting firms must separate Audit, and Consulting, and some Tax services.  This 
separation of professional responsibilities is consistent with the French model that has long 
separated the professional accounting and audit functions.   
 
Accountants and auditors like to proclaim themselves to be professionals.  Apparently, the 
government views the audit of financial statements to be a public trust that can result in 
legislation controlling the role the auditor can play.    
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However, this government oversight which can be instituted by legislation is enforced by the 
disciplinary process.  Some professionals do not follow the code of conduct predicted by the 
organizations mandated to regulate the practice of the profession (OEC, H3C, NYSOP).   The 
study of the accounting profession’s disciplinary process in both countries indicates that the 
two countries are very close in terms of the nature and the number of sanctions given. To 
enforce the codes of professional ethics the three organizations even in different countries 
have a range of similar sanctions, varying from warning to exclusion.  
 
Robertson  (Robertson  et  al,  1999  p.  74)  suggests  that  the  sanction  system  in  place  is  a 
preventive environment based on a compliance strategy. Both countries have their accounting 
professionals  being  sanctioned  at  a  similar  rate  approximately  .07%.    In  light  of  this 
insignificant number of professionals sanctioned for malpractice, the disciplinary system of 
the accounting profession is not based on a sanctioning strategy. A low rate of professional 
sanctions gives the impression that the practicing professionals are operating at a level of 
technical competency and high moral functioning.  A problem with reaching this type of 
conclusion  is  that  any  improper  conduct  regarding  financial  statement  audits  can  impact 
thousands of innocent investors, as was the case with some of the highly publicized financial 
scandals such as ENRON, WORLCOM, PARMALAT, or ELF AQUITAINE.  Because of the 
large number of citizens that can be impacted by a rogue accounting professional government 
oversight and legislation is never far away. 
 
A major difference between the two countries lies in terms of the publicity of the sanctions. 
Publication  of  the  disciplinary  cases  is  much  wider  in  the  United  States  which  uses  the 
internet.  In  France  the  publicity  is  spread  only  inside  the  profession.    In  addition  the 
practioner’s name is disclosed in  NYS whereas, the publication is anonymous in France. 
Those two facts, in line with St. Pierre et al. (1984, p. 242), helped us conclude that sanctions 
have a more material impact on American CPAs than on French Public Accountants and 
Auditors.  Material  impact  is  defined  as  impaired  reputation  leading  to  business  loss, 
according to Chaney et al. (2002, p. 1244). This statement is supported by the availability of 
fines in the United States, which can material in financial terms and most certainly dissuasive.   
CONCLUSION 
This study presented the major characteristics of the disciplinary process of the accounting 
profession  in  both  France  and  the  United  States.  This  study  finds  that  "Legalism”  is  a 
significant aspect of the American accounting profession’s disciplinary process.  This finding 
is contrary to prior studies comparing the regulation of the accounting profession in the two 
countries, using the ideal-types issued from Puxty et al. (1987) (Bédard et al., 2001; Baker et 
al., 2005).  The result is based upon the finding that France and the United States are very 
close in terms of the power of the State to discipline of the accounting profession. These 
countries are also very close when observing the outcome of the disciplinary processes. The 
disciplinary processes do not appear to be harsh nor harm the majority of practitioners.  A 
small  number  of  sanctions  were  given  to  professionals  found  to  have  not  followed  the 
Professional Code of Conduct. The small numbers involved implies that the professionals 
operate in preventive environment based upon a compliance strategy rather than functioning 
in a sphere oriented towards sanctions and unnecessary limits being placed on professionals.  20 
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